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Abstract
A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project suc-
ceeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers
payments contingent on success. We study the firm’s optimal unique-implementation
scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the firm the maximum payoff. This
scheme pays investors differential net returns (per unit of capital) depending on
the size of their investments. We show that if the distribution of the investment
threshold is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller
investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm’s payoff.
Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality.
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1 Introduction
Firms often have worthwhile projects that require the participation of multiple investors.
A key problem is that these investors face strategic risk: if not enough of them choose
to invest, the firm will not have enough capital to implement its project and generate
a return. As a result, there may be outcomes in which some or all the investors choose
not to invest because they expect that others will not invest. These outcomes are bad
for the firm and typically inefficient.
This paper studies the firm’s optimal scheme that guarantees investment as the
unique outcome. In a world without contracting constraints, where payments can be
made contingent on third parties’ choices, eliminating the possibility of bad outcomes
would impose no extra cost on the firm. But the real world is not unconstrained, and
as pointed out by the literature, bilateral contracts are often all a firm can rely on.1
Guaranteeing investment then requires the firm to compensate investors for their strate-
gic risk, a risk that depends on the amount of capital each investor pledges. A natural
question arises: how does heterogeneity in investor size affect the firm’s scheme and the
returns yielded to the firm and the investors? In particular, does an optimal scheme
treat investors differently based on size, and, if so, which investors get better terms?
How does the distribution of capital among investors affect the firm’s profits and the
feasibility of investment?
Our model consists of a firm and a set of agents. The firm owns a project that
generates a surplus if implemented, and each agent has an amount of capital to invest,
which varies across the agents. The firm’s project can be implemented—i.e., the project
“succeeds”—only if the capital raised from the agents exceeds a stochastic, initially
unknown threshold.2 The firm offers each agent two payments for investing, one if the
project succeeds and another if it fails. Each agent then chooses whether to invest with
the firm or put her capital in a safe asset that pays a fixed net return. We characterize the
firm’s optimal unique-implementation scheme. This scheme specifies individual capital
amounts and the least-cost payments such that investing these amounts with the firm is
the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.3
1See Section 2 as well as the discussions in Innes and Sexton (1994) and Segal (2003).
2This threshold captures common factors such as the project involving inputs whose prices are
random, or the firm having a stochastic source of external credit to use as additional funding. More
abstractly, our model simply assumes that the probability of project success is increasing in the amount
of capital invested.
3Formally, we require that the equilibrium be unique if the payments that the firm offers under success
are increased by any positive amount. See Section 2 for details. Our unique implementation requirement
is equivalent to having the firm maximize its expected payoff in its worst possible equilibrium outcome.
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Our first main result addresses how the optimal returns that the firm offers vary with
investor size, given a fixed set of investors. We show that if the project fails, the firm
simply refunds the agents their capital, thus paying the same zero net return to each of
them.4 However, if the project succeeds, the firm pays the agents differential net returns
depending on the size of their investments. Under a distributional assumption (which
we discuss subsequently), we show that agents with larger amounts of capital receive
higher net returns (per unit of capital) than those with smaller amounts. This pattern
is consistent with evidence from private equity, where large limited partners are given
preferential terms compared to small ones (see, e.g., Clayton, 2017). By showing that
larger investors get more per unit invested, this result also has implications for dynamic
capital markets: we identify a mechanism through which capital becomes dispersed,
pointing to “winner-takes-all dynamics” such as those that arise in tournament theory
and models of superstars (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1981).
Our second main result concerns the optimal set of investors for the firm. Fixing
the total amount of capital, we find that the firm benefits from dealing with agents
whose capital is more unequal. Specifically, any mean-preserving spread of the capital
distribution (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) reduces the firm’s cost
of raising any given level of agents’ capital. Higher dispersion in investor size therefore
increases the firm’s expected payoff from any given investment, as well as the range of
investments that are feasible. Furthermore, as an implication, we find that the firm
targets those agents with the largest endowments of capital, generating differences not
only in agents’ net investment returns but also in their access to investment opportunities.
Our last main result considers the relationship between the distribution of capital
and the distribution of returns. One might be tempted to conclude from our previous
results that not only larger investors are offered higher net returns, but also their return
advantage is larger when the agents’ investments are more unequal. We show that the
opposite is true, in the following sense: higher capital dispersion reduces the difference in
net returns between the largest and smallest investors. In fact, we find that this return
difference can decline to the extent that even the difference in the investors’ final capital
holdings declines when initial capital becomes more unequal.
To provide intuition for these results, we next describe a simple example. Consider
a project that requires I units of capital to succeed, where the threshold I is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 30]. If the project succeeds, it generates a fixed surplus
4This result applies to our benchmark setting with no initial firm capital. If the firm owns initial
capital, a subset of the agents are paid a positive net return under failure; yet, as shown in Section 5,
our qualitative conclusions are unchanged.
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A > 0 in addition to the initial investment. Suppose the firm wishes to guarantee full
investment by two agents, where agent 1 has 10 units of capital and agent 2 has 20 units.
The agents’ outside option is to invest in a safe asset that pays a net return of 10%.
In this simple example, the project succeeds for sure if both agents invest with the
firm. Hence, paying each agent a net return under success equal to the safe return
of 10% would suffice to induce an equilibrium in which both agents invest. However,
an equilibrium in which neither agent invests would also exist given this (or a slightly
higher) return. To implement full investment as the unique equilibrium outcome, the
firm must make it dominant for one of the agents to invest.
Consider first a scheme that makes investment dominant for agent 1. If only agent
1 invests, the project succeeds with probability 1/3, namely the probability that the
investment threshold is I ≤ 10. To ensure that agent 1 invests no matter what agent 2
does, it thus suffices to offer her a net return under success (slightly above) r satisfying
r/3 = 10%, i.e. r = 30%. Given agent 1’s participation, it then suffices to offer agent
2 a net return of 10% for her to also invest. It follows that the firm can guarantee full
investment at a cost of 10(30%) + 20(10%) = 5.
The alternative is to make investment dominant for agent 2. If only agent 2 invests,
the project succeeds provided that I ≤ 20, which occurs with probability 2/3. Thus, it
suffices to offer agent 2 a net return under success of 15% to guarantee her participation.
Since agent 1 will then invest as well if she is offered at least 10%, the firm’s cost is
now equal to 10(10%) + 20(15%) = 4, which is lower than under the previous scheme.
Intuitively, agent 2’s larger investment provides her with more self-insurance compared
to agent 1, and this allows the firm to pay a lower compensation for risk when agent
2’s participation is made dominant. Consequently, the firm uses a scheme that pays a
higher net return to the large investor compared to the small investor. This illustrates
our first main result.
Consider next transferring capital from the small to the large investor. For example,
suppose we transfer 4 units of capital from agent 1 to agent 2, so that the capital of
agent 1 becomes 6 and that of agent 2 becomes 24. Following analogous steps to those
above, the firm’s scheme in this case entails a net return under success of 12.5% for agent
2 and 10% for agent 1. The firm’s cost is equal to 6(10%) + 24(12.5%) = 3.6, which
is lower than the cost of 4 prior to the transfer. Because the large investor becomes
better self-insured when her capital is increased, the overall compensation for risk that
the firm has to pay declines. We thus obtain that when the distribution of capital is
more unequal, the firm’s expected payoff is higher, and a lower surplus A from success
3
suffices for the investment to be profitable. This illustrates our second main result. Our
third main result is also clear in this exercise: the difference in the agents’ net returns is
smaller when their investments are more heterogeneous.
Our paper examines a general setting in which the number of agents and their capital
levels are arbitrary, as is the distribution of the investment threshold I. We identify a
condition on the distribution function of I under which our results hold for all capital
distributions. The condition is that the inverse of the distribution function be convex,
a property that is implied by log-concavity of the distribution and thus satisfied by
most commonly used distribution functions.5 Our analysis elucidates the role of this
condition and how our findings change if it is not satisfied. In the example above, the
condition implies a risk premium per unit of capital which is decreasing and convex in
the agents’ investments, and this is why the firm minimizes costs by first guaranteeing
the participation of the large investor.
We show that our results extend to a setting in which the firm has some initial capital
of its own. The firm in this case uses its initial capital to fully insure small investors,
thus continuing to offer higher net returns to larger investors. Our results are also robust
to alternative specifications of the project returns. Moreover, while derived for a firm
that maximizes its profits, our findings are also relevant to a social planner concerned
with agents’ welfare.
Beyond capital-raising, we discuss how our model may be applied to other contract-
ing problems with externalities. These include a monopolist offering exclusive dealing
contracts to buyers to deter market entry; a firm rewarding workers to complete a joint
task; and a bank offering interest and collateral to depositors to prevent a run. Hetero-
geneity is common in these situations, and our results can be useful to understand its
implications.
A broad insight from our analysis is that strategic risk may be a driver of inequality.
A profit-maximizing mechanism favors certain agents in order to pin down their choices
and reduce the strategic risk on the part of other agents. We show that under a plausible
condition, the more favorable terms are given to those agents who are already in a more
favorable position. The mechanism therefore exacerbates initial differences among the
agents, and it also benefits from these differences. Inequality being undesirable for a
number of reasons that we do not study, our paper uncovers important economic forces
that may be behind it. We discuss policy implications for a social planner in Section 6.
5These include the exponential, gamma, log-normal, Pareto, and uniform distributions (see Bagnoli
and Bergstrom, 2005).
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Related literature. Our model is one of multi-agent contracting, related to the work
by Segal (1999, 2003) and Bernstein and Winter (2012), among others. These are ab-
stract models with externalities among the agents which are exogenously given. In
contrast, we consider an applied problem in which the externalities among the agents
are endogenously determined by the firm’s contract offers, and in which contracts are
required to satisfy the firm’s budget constraint.
Our main departure from the literature is that we study agents who are heterogeneous
in their endowments. As such, we obtain a number of results that have no parallel in
other models. It is worth noting that while heterogeneity is our focus, our analysis also
has implications for the case in which agents are homogeneous. Specifically, we find
that the firm’s optimal scheme gives differential net returns to the agents even if they
all have the same amount of capital. This is analogous to the results in Winter (2004),
where an optimal team incentive scheme is shown to discriminate among ex ante identical
workers. Similar results appear in Segal (2003) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2015), as well
as in Inostroza and Pavan (2018) in the context of persuasion. Given that an optimal
scheme creates heterogeneity among homogenous agents, our paper studies the natural
question of how the scheme deals with heterogeneous agents.
Two related papers that analyze heterogeneity are Bernstein and Winter (2012) and
Sa´kovics and Steiner (2012). Unlike our model, neither of these feature contingent pay-
ments: the principal offers fixed subsidies for the agents to participate in the mechanism,
and agents’ benefits from participating and their externalities are exogenous. Bernstein
and Winter (2012) study how asymmetries in the agents’ bilateral externalities affect
the principal’s scheme and revenue. Instead, we look directly at differences in agents’
attributes, whose effects on the matrix of externalities may be complex and endogenous.
In fact, while in our model the magnitude of an investor’s externality is related to size,
we find that the relationship between size and contract terms depends on a distributional
condition, so a higher externality does not necessarily imply more favorable terms as in
Bernstein and Winter. The difference arises primarily from the fact that here agents’
externalities are neither bilateral nor additive. In our framework, the externality that
an agent exerts on another agent’s gains depends on who else is in the pool of investors.
Sa´kovics and Steiner (2012) consider a global game with incomplete information,
where agents differ in their influence over the aggregate action, benefit from project
success, and cost of investment. They obtain a coarse monotonicity result whereby agents
receive full, partial, or no subsidy depending on their influence-to-benefit ratio. There is
no analog in their paper to our finding that an optimal scheme increases agents’ initial
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differences, nor to the condition that we identify for this result to hold. Our analysis of
how payoffs change when agents become more heterogeneous is another departure from
their work.
Finally, there is a literature on capital-raising for new projects. Particularly relevant
is Akerlof and Holden (2018), which shares our motivation of examining the role of
investor size.6 The paper differs in various aspects, most importantly in that it is not
concerned with optimal mechanism design. The authors compare equilibrium outcomes
under different market configurations, using risk dominance to select among multiple
equilibria. They show that the presence of a large investor who moves first can change
the risk-dominant equilibrium from a low-investment to a high-investment one. In a
competitive market setting with many projects, the large investor can thus earn rents.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
A firm owns a project which yields a fixed surplus A > 0 if implemented. The firm can
implement the project only if the capital invested in it exceeds an initially unknown,





, for some I > 0.7 Hence, if capital x is invested, with probability
F (x) the threshold satisfies I ≤ x and the project is implemented, yielding final capital
x+A.8 With the remaining probability 1−F (x) the threshold is I > x and the project
is not implemented, so the final capital is x. We will refer to project implementation as
success and to no implementation as failure.
We begin by assuming that the firm has no capital of its own, deferring the study
of how the firm would use any initial capital to Section 5. The firm raises capital from
a set of N > 1 heterogeneous agents, indexed by n ∈ S = {1, . . . , N}. Each agent n
has a capital endowment xn > 0. Instead of investing with the firm, agents can invest
their capital in a safe asset that pays a net return θ > 0. (All returns are net percentage
returns, meaning that if agent n invests xn in the safe asset, her payoff is (1 + θ)xn.)
All of this is common knowledge.
6See also Andreoni (1998) and Akerlof and Holden (2016).
7Setting the lower bound of the support to zero simplifies the exposition. As will be clear in the next
sections, our results are unchanged so long as this bound is smaller than the largest investor’s amount
of capital, and our problem is moot otherwise.
8In Section 6, we show that our results also apply if the firm’s surplus from implementing the project
is proportional to the capital invested instead of a constant amount.
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The order of moves is as follows. First, the firm offers each agent a contract speci-
fying payments in the events of project success and failure, as we describe in the next
subsection. Second, the agents decide simultaneously whether to invest with the firm
or put their capital in the safe asset. Finally, the investment threshold I is realized,
the project is implemented if and only if the capital raised by the firm exceeds I, and
payments are made.
2.2 Firm’s problem
The firm wishes to guarantee its maximum possible payoff. Its problem is to choose a
payoff-maximizing scheme subject to satisfying its budget constraint and to inducing a
unique equilibrium outcome.
As further discussed in Section 2.3, we focus on contracts that are bilateral and
simple. For each n ∈ S, the firm specifies an amount of capital xn ∈ [0, xn] and returns
(rn, kn) conditional on agent n investing xn in the firm’s project. The return rn is the
net return that agent n receives if the project succeeds; the return kn is the agent’s net
return in the case of failure.
Given a scheme specifying investments (xn)n∈S and returns (rn, kn)n∈S, denote agent
n’s decision by yn ∈ {0, 1}, where yn = 1 means invest xn with the firm and yn = 0
means invest xn in the safe asset. The firm’s budget constraint requires that the total
payments offered to the agents do not exceed the firm’s final capital, regardless of the
set of agents who invest in the project and whether or not the project is implemented.
That is, for all profiles of choices Y = (y1, . . . , yN), the firm’s scheme must satisfy
N∑
n=1
rnynxn ≤ A and
N∑
n=1
knynxn ≤ 0. (BC)
In addition, the firm’s scheme must implement the agents’ investments in a unique
outcome. The firm’s problem can be decomposed in two steps:
(i) For fixed capital amounts (xn)n∈S, find the optimal scheme (rn, kn)n∈S guaranteeing
investments (xn)n∈S.
(ii) Given step (i), find the optimal capital amounts (xn)n∈S, where xn ∈ [0, xn] for
each n ∈ S.
We will address step (i) in Section 3 and step (ii) in Section 4. We next formalize
the firm’s problem in step (i).
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Fix capital amounts (xn)n∈S where, to avoid trivialities and without loss, we take
xn > 0 for each n ∈ S. Given (xn)n∈S, say that a scheme (rn, kn)n∈S is incentive
inducing (INI) if Y1 ≡ (1, . . . , 1) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game induced
by (rn, kn)n∈S. Since the set of INI schemes is open (because rn and kn take continuous
values), we define an optimal scheme as the least-cost scheme (rn, kn)n∈S such that, for
any ε > 0, raising rn by ε for each n ∈ S yields an INI scheme.9 Formally, let Un(yn,Y−n)
be agent n’s expected return on xn given net returns (rn, kn), investment choice yn, and



















ynxn + θ(1− yn)xn.
A profile Y ′ = (y′1, . . . , y′N) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if y′n ∈ argmaxy∈{0,1} Un(y,Y ′−n)
for all n ∈ S. Let E ((rn, kn)n∈S) be the set of Nash equilibrium profiles under scheme
(rn, kn)n∈S. An optimal scheme (rn, kn)n∈S must satisfy the following two conditions:
Y1 ∈ E((rn, kn)n∈S); (C1)
If Y ∈ E((rn, kn)n∈S),Y 6= Y1, then Un(1,Y−n) = Un(0,Y−n), yn = 0 for some n. (C2)
(C1) says that there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each agent n ∈ S invests xn
with the firm. (C2) says that in any Nash equilibrium in which some agents n ∈ S do not
invest xn with the firm, at least one such non-investing agent is willing to invest xn with
the firm. These conditions are necessary and sufficient for the scheme (rn + ε, kn)n∈S to
be an INI scheme for any ε > 0.10
Let XN ≡
∑N




n)n∈S guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S













knxn (1− F (XN)) (P)
subject to (BC), (C1), and (C2).
9Note that an optimal scheme is not itself INI as it admits equilibria which are not full participation.
However, paying each agent slightly more under success eliminates all such equilibria. This definition is
equivalent to assuming that agents invest with the firm when indifferent given their conjectures.
10Necessity is immediate. Sufficiency follows from Lemma 1 in the next section.
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2.3 Discussion of assumptions
Before we solve the firm’s problem, it is worth discussing some of our model assumptions.
First, we have assumed that the firm cannot coordinate the agents to its preferred
equilibrium when multiple equilibria exist. This assumption is what motivates the re-
quirement of unique implementation, both in our paper and in related work (Segal,
2003; Winter, 2004; Bernstein and Winter, 2012). If there are multiple equilibria, agents
may play a non-desirable one; indeed, several experiments find that subjects are often
trapped in bad equilibrium outcomes in environments with externalities (see, e.g., De-
vetag and Ortmann, 2007). Our unique implementation requirement is equivalent to
having the firm maximize its profits in the equilibrium outcome yielding the lowest prof-
its for the firm.11 Naturally, if the firm could instead “pick” the equilibrium to be played
by the agents, then it would be able to extract the full surplus by specifying returns
(rn, kn) = (θ/F (XN), 0) for each n ∈ S and some (xn)n∈S. Under such a scheme, there is
an equilibrium that implements investments (xn)n∈S and keeps all agents to their outside
option, but equilibria with lower investment also exist.
Second, we have posited that the agents make their investment choices simultane-
ously, i.e. under imperfect information. Our analysis is unchanged if instead the agents
move sequentially, with each agent observing the decisions of her predecessors, so long
as we continue to consider all Nash equilibria of the game. If subgame perfection is
imposed, the problem becomes trivial: by offering rn = θ/F (XN) (plus ε > 0 arbitrar-
ily small) and kn = 0 to each agent n ∈ S, the firm induces investments (xn)n∈S as the
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential game, thus extracting the full
surplus.12 We view the simultaneous game as a simple (and stark) way to capture the
fact that investors in reality have limited information about others’ investment choices,
and their decisions are not sequential insofar as they can be revised.
Third, following the literature (Segal, 2003; Winter, 2004), we have assumed that the
firm can rely on bilateral contracts only. That is, contracts cannot directly condition
on third parties’ actions: the payment to an agent does not depend on other agents’
investment decisions except insofar as these decisions affect whether the project gets
implemented. The motivation for this restriction stems from the difficulty to verify in
practice the capital pledged by third parties. If an agent sues for breach of contract, a
court can require the agent to prove that she invested with the firm (or else she lacks
11See Segal (2003) for a general argument.
12If we impose subgame perfection but require that investment with the firm be a dominant strategy
in each subgame (as in Innes and Sexton, 1994, for example), then our results apply.
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standing to sue), and it can plausibly verify whether or not the firm implemented some
large project. It is less clear whether the court can identify the firm’s other investors and
the amounts that they invested. We focus on situations in which it cannot. If instead
contracts can condition on third parties’ choices, then again the firm would be able to
extract the full surplus.
Fourth, we have also restricted attention to contracts that are “simple.” Specifically,





n)) for different amounts x
′
n that the agent may choose to invest.
In a simple contract, the firm specifies an amount xn and returns (rn, kn) conditional
on the agent investing that amount (and zero returns otherwise). Naturally, only sim-
ple contracts are relevant if agents’ decisions are binary, as is the case when there are
indivisibilities in investment.13 Moreover, even when investment is fully divisible, we
provide conditions in the Online Appendix under which simple contracts are without
loss of optimality.14
Finally, we have required that the firm satisfy its budget constraint both on and off the
equilibrium path. That is, the firm must be able to follow through on its commitments
to the agents regardless of which agents decide to invest in the project.15 An alternative
possibility would be to allow the firm to offer any scheme (rn, kn)n∈S that satisfies its
budget constraint on the equilibrium path (i.e. under the investments (xn)n∈S), and
each agent n ∈ S would then assess the credibility of her offer (rn, kn) according to
her conjecture of others’ behavior. We show in the Online Appendix that, given our
focus on unique implementation, both possibilities yield the same results. We regard
the stronger budget-balance condition as more plausible, since the irrational behavior of
some investors cannot serve the firm with an excuse for not fulfilling its contracts with
other investors.
3 Optimal Scheme
In this section, we address step (i) of the firm’s problem: for fixed capital amounts
(xn)n∈S, we study the firm’s optimal scheme that guarantees these investments, namely
the scheme that solves program (P). Without loss, we take xn > 0 for each n ∈ S. We
begin by restating constraints (C1)-(C2) in program (P) using the following equivalence:
13Indivisibilities are common in applications where capital takes the form of a specific resource or
skill, or where the project requires a number of discrete investments. See Section 6 for some examples.
14See Segal (2003) for an analysis of menu contracts in a more general setting.
15This is analogous, for example, to the requirements in Holmstro¨m (1982).
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Lemma 1. (C1)-(C2) hold if and only if there exists a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) of
the set of agents such that, for each i ∈ S, agent ni is willing to invest with the firm if
agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest with the firm, no matter what the other agents do.
An optimal scheme makes it iteratively dominant for each agent to invest with the
firm. To see why this follows from (C1)-(C2), note that by (C2), there must exist an
agent n1 who is willing to invest with the firm when no other agent does. Moreover, by
(C1), this agent must also be willing to invest when all other agents do. We show that
as a result, n1 is willing to invest with the firm no matter what the other agents do. The
reason is that n1’s expected payoff from investing is a weighted average of her returns
under success and under failure, where the weights are the probabilities of each event
and thus achieve their highest and lowest values when all and none of the other agents
invest. Having established this property for n1, we then use an induction argument to
complete the proof of the “only if” claim in Lemma 1.16
Given this result, it will be useful (and without loss) to study schemes which specify
some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) of the set of agents and returns (ri, ki) for each
agent ni ∈ S. We proceed by first characterizing the optimal returns (r∗i , k∗i )i∈S and then




Given a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN), denote the aggregate capital of the first i agents
in the permutation by Xi ≡
∑i
j=1 xnj , where we omit the dependence on pi to ease the
exposition. (Note that, as previously defined, XN corresponds to the total amount of
capital.) We obtain:
Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists an optimal scheme guaranteeing investments
(xn)n∈S. Any such scheme specifies some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and returns
(r∗i , k
∗
i )i∈S such that, for each i ∈ S, agent ni is indifferent over investing with the firm
if agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest with the firm and agents (ni+1, . . . , nN) do not. Moreover,




and k∗i = 0.
An optimal scheme implies a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) such that the first agent
16The proof of Lemma 1 is general in that it does not rely on specific externalities between the agents.
The result will also apply to the setting studied in Section 5 in which the firm owns some initial capital.
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in the permutation is indifferent between investing and not when no other agent invests,
the second agent is indifferent between investing and not when the first agent invests
and the others do not, and so on. For intuition, recall that by Lemma 1, there is a
permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) in which each agent ni is willing to invest when agents
(n1, . . . , ni−1) invest, no matter the rest. This implies that for each i ∈ S and each
j ∈ {i, . . . , N},
r∗iF (Xj) + k
∗
i (1− F (Xj)) ≥ θ. (1)
Now note that the firm’s budget constraint (BC) requires ki ≤ 0 for each i ∈ S; given
no initial capital of its own, the firm cannot credibly commit to pay an agent a positive
return under failure. Since the agents can obtain a net return θ > 0 by investing in the
safe asset, condition (1) then requires that the firm offer a strictly positive net return
ri > 0 under success. It follows that for each i ∈ S,
r∗i > 0 ≥ k∗i , (2)
and thus the scheme induces strategic complementarities. That is, under an optimal
scheme, each agent ni’s expected payoff from investing with the firm is increasing in the
other agents’ investments.
The strategic complementarities in turn simplify the agents’ participation constraints.
Given the inequalities in (2), we obtain that condition (1) is satisfied for each i ∈ S and
each j ∈ {i, . . . , N} if and only if it is satisfied for each i ∈ S and j = i: the firm can
induce agent ni to participate no matter what agents (ni+1, . . . , nN) do if it can induce
agent ni to participate when all such other agents do not. Furthermore, we show that
by optimality, condition (1) must hold with equality for each i ∈ S and j = i: otherwise,
the firm could lower a return ri and increase its payoff while preserving incentives and
relaxing its budget constraint. Therefore, we obtain
r∗iF (Xi) + k
∗
i (1− F (Xi)) = θ (3)
for each i ∈ S. This yields the first part of Proposition 1, which, in the literature’s
jargon, shows that any optimal scheme is a “divide and conquer” scheme.17
The second part of Proposition 1 uses the binding participation constraints in (3)
to derive optimal returns. We show that it is optimal to set (r∗i , k
∗
i ) = (θ/F (Xi) , 0)
17See Segal (2003). Divide and conquer strategies are also discussed in the literature on exclusionary
contracts, including Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Innes and Sexton (1994), and Segal and
Whinston (2000).
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for each i ∈ S. The idea is intuitive. The firm conditions on all agents (n1, . . . , nN)
investing in the project, whereas, as shown in (3), each agent ni conditions on only agents
(n1, . . . , ni) investing. Hence, the firm assigns a higher probability to success than each
agent ni does, which means that the firm values ri relative to ki more than each agent
ni. As a consequence, the firm benefits from reducing ri, and thus increasing ki, as much
as it can, subject to its budget constraint (BC) and the participation constraints in (3).
Formally, we show that if a scheme specifies ki < 0 for some i ∈ S,18 we can perform
a perturbation in which we increase ki by ε > 0 arbitrarily small and reduce ri so as
to keep the left-hand side of (3) unchanged. The perturbed scheme satisfies the firm’s
budget constraint and preserves the agents’ incentives. Moreover, we show that the
perturbation increases the firm’s expected payoff in (P). It follows that it is optimal to
set k∗i = 0 and thus, by (3), r
∗
i = θ/F (Xi) for each i ∈ S.19
Proposition 1 has important implications for the agents’ payoffs. The proposition
shows that the firm treats the agents symmetrically under failure: each agent is re-
funded her capital if the project is not implemented. However, in the case of success,
returns differ across the agents. Given the permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN), agents who are
positioned towards the beginning of the permutation are offered a higher net return (per
unit of capital invested) than those positioned later in the permutation. The reason is
that agents with a higher rank i condition on a larger set of other agents investing with
the firm; thus, given the strategic complementarities, their participation constraints are
less costly to satisfy. Clearly, in light of this result, a key question is how an optimal
permutation pi∗ ranks the agents given the heterogeneity in their capital amounts. We
turn to this question in the next subsection.
A useful property of the returns in Proposition 1 is that they maximally relax the
firm’s budget constraint. Specifically, since k∗i = 0 for each i ∈ S, these returns minimize
not only the firm’s total costs but also its costs under success,
∑N
i=1 rixni , for some
permutation pi. It follows that an optimal scheme guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S
exists if and only if a scheme with returns (r∗i , k
∗
i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0) for some permutation
pi satisfies (BC). As formalized in the next corollary, the latter requires that the firm’s
surplus A from success be large enough.
18Recall that the firm’s budget constraint requires ki ≤ 0 for each i ∈ S.
19These returns are strictly optimal for i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} and weakly optimal for i = N .
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Corollary 1. An optimal scheme guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S exists if and only if






We end our discussion of Proposition 1 with a remark. As noted above, the firm’s
scheme induces a supermodular game among the agents, namely one characterized by
strategic complementarities. As a result, our requirement of unique implementation in
Nash equilibria also yields unique implementation in rationalizable strategies.
Remark 1. Take an optimal scheme guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S. Then (xn)n∈S
is a Nash equilibrium and no other outcome is rationalizable.
3.2 Optimal permutation
We now turn to the question of how an optimal permutation ranks the agents. Assume
hereafter that the condition in Corollary 1 holds, so an optimal scheme guaranteeing
investments (xn)n∈S exists. By Proposition 1, it is optimal for the firm to specify some




i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0)
for each agent ni ∈ S. Substituting in the firm’s expected payoff in (P), under such a









F (XN) . (4)
It follows from (4) and Corollary 1 that a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) is optimal if







The next proposition shows that (5) is minimized by ranking the agents in decreasing
order of the size of their investments, provided that a condition on the investment thresh-
old distribution holds. This condition is that 1/F (x) be convex (over the relevant range),
and it is satisfied by most commonly used distributions, as we explain subsequently.
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Proposition 2. Suppose 1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0. Then for any in-
vestments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X, an optimal permutation is pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n∗N) such
that
xn∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ xn∗N .
Consequently, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors.
The logic for the optimal permutation is as follows. Given a permutation pi =
(n1, . . . , nN), Proposition 1 shows that an optimal scheme compensates each agent ni ∈ S
on the marginal unit of capital invested in the project. That is, for each unit invested by
agent ni, the firm pays the agent a return under success r
∗
i = θ/F (Xi). If 1/F (x) is con-
vex, then the return curve θ/F (Xi) is decreasing and convex in the capital Xi invested
up to agent ni. This means that the firm benefits from moving down this return curve as
quickly as possible; the faster capital is accumulated along the sequence (xn1 , . . . , xnN ),
the lower is the sum of returns that the firm has to pay under success. It follows that
it is optimal to rank the agents in decreasing size order, from the agent with the largest
amount of capital to that with the smallest amount.
Intuitively, to guarantee investment, the firm has to compensate the agents for the
strategic risk that they face in addition to the fundamental risk. The risk premium for
agent ni is proportional to 1/F (Xi), which depends on the agent’s rank i and her amount
of capital xni . Agents with more capital face less risk because their large investment
secures itself. This self-insurance reduces the risk premium that the firm has to pay to
large investors, and the magnitude of the reduction depends on how sharply the risk
premium drops as a function of investment. Proposition 2 thus says that large investors
should be placed in the permutation according to when the risk premium drops most
sharply with investment. If 1/F (Xi) is convex, this occurs when the existing investment
is small, so the firm places large investors early in the permutation.20
Figure 1 illustrates the result using the example described in the Introduction. We
take F uniform over [0, 30] and θ = 10%. The figure depicts the return curve θ/F (Xi),
showing that the return that the firm pays under success decreases at a decreasing rate
with each additional unit of capital invested in the project. If there are N = 2 agents
with capital x1 = 10 and x2 = 20, then by Proposition 2 the optimal permutation is
pi∗ = (2, 1). That is, the firm sets n∗1 = 2 and n
∗
2 = 1 as agent 2’s capital amount is larger
than agent 1’s. The optimal returns under success are r∗1 = 15% for agent n
∗
1 = 2 and
20Conversely, if 1/F (Xi) is concave, the firm would benefit from placing large investors late in the
permutation. See Section 6.
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• If N = 2 with (x1, x2) = (1, 2), pay 15% to agent 2, 10% to agent 1
• Firm’s cost is 4. If reverse order in permutation, cost is 5
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
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to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
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(=)) We begin by pr ving that (C1)-(C2) imply a permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
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Figure 3: Price of coordination for N = 2 agents with aggregate capital X2 = 30, F uniform




increases from 10 to 30.
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
0 10 20 30
Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution of wealth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
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showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
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Figure 1: Return curve for F uniform over [0, 30] and θ = 10%. Given N = 2 agents with
capital amounts x1 = 10 and x2 = 20, an optimal scheme specifies the permutation pi
∗ = (2, 1)
and pays returns under success of 15% and 10% to agents 2 and 1 respectively.
r∗2 = 10% for agent n
∗
2 = 1 (and the optim l returns under failur are equal to zero for
both agents), yielding a cost for he firm of 20(15%) + 10(10%) = 4. If the firm instead
ranks the agents according to pi = (1, 2), then the returns are r1 = 30% for agent n1 = 1
and r2 = 10% for agent n2 = 2, yielding a higher cost of 10(30%) + 20(10%) = 5.
As stated in Prop sition 2, this characterization of an op imal permutation has direct
implic tions on investors’ returns: given Pr position 1, it implies t at l rger investors
receive higher net returns than smaller ones. The analysis therefore provides an ex-
planation for the patterns of returns often observed in practice. As mentioned in the
Introduction, our results are consistent with evidence from private equity. Tan (2016)
and Clayton (2017), for example, point out an increasing tendency of private equity firms
to give preferential treatment to limited partners based on size. The empirical findings
in Dyck and Pomorski (2016) reveal that large investors receive higher net returns than
small investors even when restricting attention to private equity investments without
any preferential access. Proposition 2 suggests that these differential returns may arise
as a firm’s profit-maximizing solution to a coordination problem in investment.
By showing that larger investors get more per unit invested, the analysis also high-
lights a mechanism through which capital becomes dispersed. We find that the firm’s op-
timal scheme exacerbates agents’ initial differences. In fact, the results point to “winner-
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takes-all dynamics,” whereby large investors become larger over time, even when differ-
ences in initial capital amounts may be small. These effects resemble those that arise,
albeit for different reasons, in tournament theory and models of superstars (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1981).21
The result in Proposition 2 holds under a condition on the distribution F of the
investment threshold. It is worth noting that this condition is implied by log-concavity:
Remark 2. If F (x) is log-concave, then 1/F (x) is convex.
Many familiar distributions are log-concave, including exponential, gamma, log-
normal, Pareto, and uniform (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).22
Finally, one may wonder about the necessity of our condition on F . We can show that
if 1/F (x) is strictly concave for some x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, then there exist capital amounts
(xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X such that a permutation that ranks the agents in decreasing size
order is not optimal. Hence,
Remark 3. Convexity of 1/F (x) over the relevant range is not only sufficient but also
necessary for the statement in Proposition 2 to hold.
Our emphasis is on the case in which 1/F (x) is convex because, as noted, most of the
distributions that are frequently used satisfy this property. Moreover, 1/F (x) cannot
be globally concave (since 1/F (x) → ∞ as x → 0), and thus an analysis under 1/F (x)
concave must be conditioned on the range of capital [min{xn|n ∈ S}, XN ] given (xn)n∈S.
We discuss this possibility in Section 6.
4 Distribution of Capital
So far we have focused on step (i) of the firm’s problem, taking the amounts of capital
(xn)n∈S that the firm raises as given. We now consider step (ii): given that an optimal
scheme guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S is characterized by Proposition 1 and Proposi-
tion 2, we study the optimal investments that the firm induces. Put differently, we ask:
how does the distribution of capital among the agents impact the firm’s payoff?
We compare distributions of capital using the following definition of mean-preserving
spread:
21In a dynamic setting, further considerations may come into play, as the firm could potentially offer
returns as a function of an agent’s history of investments. See Rey and Tirole (2007) for an insightful
related study in the context of cooperatives. A dynamic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
22Log-concavity of the distribution function is implied by, but weaker than, log-concavity of the
density function.
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Definition 1. Let H and Ĥ be right-continuous, nondecreasing functions from [0, X]
to {0, . . . , N}, for some X > 0. The function Ĥ is a mean-preserving spread of H
if it is second-order stochastically dominated by H: for all z ∈ [0, X], ∫ z
0
Ĥ (x) dx ≥∫ z
0
H (x) dx, with equality for z = X.
For any capital amounts (xn)n∈S and level x > 0, let H(x) denote the number of
agents n ∈ S whose capital xn does not exceed x. Clearly, the function H is a right-
continuous, nondecreasing function from R+ to {0, . . . , N}.23 As for the other direction,
let H be any right-continuous, nondecreasing function from [0, X] to {0, . . . , N}, for any
X > 0. Then the capital amounts induced by H are the amounts (xn)n∈S distributed
according to H: for each n ∈ S, xn = min {x ∈ [0, X] | H (x) ≥ n}.
4.1 Optimal investments
The next proposition shows that for any given total investment XN , the firm benefits
from the individual investments (xn)n∈S being more unequally distributed:
Proposition 3. Suppose 1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and consider invest-
ments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X and distribution H. Let Ĥ be a mean-preserving spread of
H and (x̂n)n∈S the investments induced by Ĥ. The firm’s expected payoff under (x̂n)n∈S
is higher than that under (xn)n∈S.
For intuition, consider the example from the Introduction, with F uniform over [0, 30]
and θ = 10%. Suppose first that the firm raised capital from N = 3 agents with
x1 = x2 = x3 = 10. By our results in the previous section and as can be seen in Figure 1,
the firm’s optimal scheme would then entail costs equal to 10(30% + 15% + 10%) = 5.5.
Now suppose that two of these investors were “merged” into a single larger investor, so
the firm raises capital from N = 2 agents with x1 = 10 and x2 = 20. The firm’s costs
under an optimal scheme would then be lower, equal to 20(15%) + 10(10%) = 4. The
reason is that merging the agents reduces the strategic uncertainty: while each separate
agent faces uncertainty about the investment decision of the other agent, the merged
agent knows that she will invest her whole capital amount in the firm’s project. This
allows the firm to guarantee the same total investment at a lower risk premium.
Proposition 3 shows that this logic holds more generally. We find that any mean-
preserving spread of the distribution of capital increases the firm’s payoff. To see why this
23The function H differs from a cumulative distribution function insofar as its maximum value is not
1 but N .
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is the case, consider capital amounts (xn)n∈S with distribution H. Any mean-preserving
spread Ĥ can be obtained from H by performing a finite sequence of transfers from
smaller to larger investors (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). We show that each such
transfer makes the firm better off. Fixing an optimal permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN)
under (xn)n∈S, a transfer from a small to a large investor allows the firm to move down
the optimal return curve θ/F (Xi) more quickly and thus reduce its costs. Intuitively, the
transfer lowers the required risk premium by increasing the self-insurance of the large
investor. This implies that the firm’s payoff under the induced amounts (x̂n)n∈S is higher
than that under (xn)n∈S given optimal returns and the original permutation pi. Clearly,
changing to a permutation that is optimal under (x̂n)n∈S can only raise the firm’s payoff
further. It follows that this operation always benefits the firm.
In the limit, the operation in Proposition 3 would concentrate all the capital of the
agents in only one of them. In fact, if the firm raised capital from only one agent, this
agent would face no strategic risk, and the firm would be able to raise the total capital
XN by offering a net return under success equal to θ/F (XN). The firm’s costs in this
case would be minimized and equal to XNθ. The firm’s costs are higher when raising
capital from multiple agents because of the coordination problem governing the agents’
interaction. The price of coordination is the additional cost above XNθ that the firm












j=1 xn∗j . Proposition 3 implies that the price of coordination is lower the more
unequal is the distribution of agents’ investments. Figure 2 provides an illustration using
the example discussed above.
Proposition 3 has immediate implications on the feasibility of investment. Since a
more unequal distribution of capital among the agents increases the firm’s payoff from
any given investment, such a distribution also reduces the minimum surplus A that is
required from a project for investment to be profitable. As a consequence, we find that a
larger range of investments can be undertaken when the population of investors is more
heterogeneous.
Returning to the firm’s problem, the result in Proposition 3 also tells us what are the
optimal investments (x∗n)n∈S that the firm induces from the agents. For any given total
investment XN , we find that the firm raises as much capital as it can from the agents with
the largest capital endowments. This solution yields the most unequal distribution over
the agents’ investments (xn)n∈S that is feasible given the agents’ endowments (xn)n∈S,
and so it is optimal by Proposition 3.
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs







. Given F uniform over [0, 3] and ✓ = 10%, this simplifies
to 10%(1    ), so the price of coordination decreases linearly in this example as we
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increases from 10 to 30.
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
0 10 20 30
Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distribution of wealth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
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Our model therefore predicts that innovation will be higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more u equal distribution of wealth fosters entrepreneurship by increasing the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evidence
that wealth inequality is positively correlated with entrepr neurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects n social welfare by increasing
innovation, the r other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
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Example
Suppose F uniform on [0, 3], ✓ = 10%, integer capital units
• Pay 30% on first unit, 15% on second, 10% on third
• If N = 2 with (x1, x2) = (1, 2), pay 15% to agent 2, 10% to agent 1
• Firm’s cost is 4. If reverse order in permutation, cost is 5
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Claim





  If ki < 0,   ki by small   > 0 and   ri by   i for  i ⌘ 1  F (Xi)
F (Xi)
  Incentives are preserved
  Firm’s payo  V changes by   (F (XN )  F (Xi))
F (Xi)
  0
Intuition: firm conditions on all investing, ni on only nj , j  i
• Hence, firm values ri relative to ki more than ni
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Example
If N = 2 with (x1, x2) = (1, 2), pay 15% to agent 2, 10% to agent 1
• Firm’s cost is 0.4. If reverse order in permutation, cost is 0.5
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the essence of the result in
Proposition 3.
Figure 3 shows how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
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Our model therefore predicts that inn vation will be higher in more unequal soci-
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1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one sin le agen with c pital x = 3, so its costs
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Figure 2 shows that if we now were to transfer   2 (0, 1] units of capital from agent 1
to agent 2, we would lower the firm’s costs further. This is the es ence of the result in
Proposition 3.
F gure 3 show how the price of coordination defined in (8) changes as we modify
the distribution of capital. The figure depicts this price when dealing with N = 2
agents with capital x1     and x2 +  . We take x1 = 1, x2 and vary   from 0 to
1. When   = 1, the firm deals with one single agent with capital x = 3, so its costs
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6 C ncluding Remark
A Proofs
Thr ughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof f Lemma 1
(=)) We b in by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
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Figure 3: Price of coordination for N = 2 agents with aggregate capital X2 = 30, F uniform




increases from 10 to 30.
H of capital in S, and let bS be the set of N agents induced by bH. The set of viable
projects in bS is larger than that in S.
0 0 20 30
Our model therefore predicts that innovatio will b higher in more unequal soci-
eties. A more unequal distributio of wealth foste s entrepreneurshi by increasin the
profitability, and thus viability, of new projects. There is in fact empirical evid nce
that wealth i equality is positively correlated wit entrepreneurship (Naude´, 2010), and
the literature has pointed to credit constraints and di↵erential savings rates as possible
explanations. Our model reveals a di↵erent mechanism, which operates directly via an
entrepreneur’s costs of raising capital to fund new projects. Of course, while the result
suggests that wealth inequality could have positive e↵ects on social welfare by increasing
innovation, there are other important negative welfare implications of inequality that
our model does not reflect.
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of the agents’ initial
capital and the distribution of their returns and final capital. Our analysis in Section 3.2
showed that given a fixed set S of N > 1 agents, an optimal scheme pays higher returns
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Figure 2: Return curve for F uniform over [0, 30] and ✓ = 10%. If there are N = 3 agents
with c pital a ounts x1 = x2 = x3 = 10, th firm’s costs under an optimal scheme are equal
to 10(30%+15%+10%). If there are N = 2 agents with capital amounts x1 = 10 and x2 = 20,
the firm’s costs under an optimal scheme are equal to 20(15%) + 10(10%).
XN by o↵ering a net turn under success equ l t ✓/F (XN). The firm’s costs in this
case wo ld be minimized nd equal to XN✓. Th firm’s costs are lar er when raisi g
capital from multiple agents because of the coordination problem governing the agents’
interaction. The price of coordination is the additional cost above XN✓ that the firm













j=1 xn⇤j . Proposition 3 implies that the price of coordination is lower the
more uneq al is the distribution of agents’ investments. Figure 3 provides an ill stra ion
using the exa pl discusse above.
Proposition 3 has immediate implications on the feasibility of investment. Since a
more unequal distribution of capital among the agents increases the firm’s payo↵ from
any give invest ent, uch a distribution also reduces the minimum surplus A that is
required from a project for investment to be profitable. As a consequence, we find that
a larger ran e of proje ts can be undertaken wh the population of investors is mor
he erogeneous.
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Figure 2: Price of coordination for F uniform over [0, 30], θ = 10%, and N = 2 agents with




from 10 to 30.
Corollary 2. Suppose 1/F (x) is co vex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and agents’ endowments
satisfy
∑N
n=1 xn ≡ XN ≤ X. Consider a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) that ranks the
agents in d creasing endowment order, i.e. with i ≤ i′ if and nly if xni ≥ xni′ . For




xni if i < i
∗,
x∗ni∗ if i = i
∗,
0 otherwise,

















F (XN) . (6)
Note that the firm’s scheme may imply differences among the agents not only in
their net returns from investment but also in their access to investment opportunities.
Specifically, if the total capital available XN exceeds the amount XN that the firm raises,
then the firm targets the largest investors in the set and excludes smaller investors from
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the project.
Given the optimal individual investments as a function of XN , the second part of
Corollary 2 completes our characterization of the firm’s optimal scheme by solving for
the optimal total investment X∗N . The program in (6) follows directly from our charac-
terization in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
4.2 Distribution of returns
Our last result concerns the relationship between the distribution of capital among the
agents and the distribution of the agents’ net investment returns. Consider an optimal
scheme guaranteeing investments (xn)n∈S. By Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the
scheme specifies a permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) ranking the agents in decreasing size
order and yields each agent ni an expected net return F (XN)r
∗
i . Since r
∗
i ≥ r∗i′ for
i ≤ i′, the range of net returns is equal to the difference between the largest and smallest
investors’ net returns, F (XN) (r
∗
1 − r∗N). We find that if the distribution of investments
becomes more unequal, the dispersion of net returns as measured by the range declines:
Proposition 4. Suppose 1/F (x) is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and consider invest-
ments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X and distribution H. Let Ĥ be a mean-preserving spread of
H and (x̂n)n∈S the investments induced by Ĥ. The range of net returns offered by the
firm under (x̂n)n∈S is smaller than that under (xn)n∈S.
Recall that any mean-preserving spread Ĥ can be obtained from the original distri-
bution H by performing a finite sequence of transfers from smaller to larger investors.
To prove the proposition, we show that any such transfer keeps the smallest investor’s
net return unchanged (and equal to θ) while reducing the largest investor’s net return
(strictly if the transfer increases this investor’s capital). These effects apply regardless of
whether the identities of the smallest and largest investors change, and they imply that
the range of net returns becomes smaller. In this sense, we find that the firm’s scheme
is less discriminatory when the agents’ capital amounts are more heterogeneous.
The example from the Introduction offers an illustration. For F uniform over [0, 30]
and θ = 10%, compare two agents with capital amounts (x1, x2) = (10, 20) against two
agents with capital amounts (x̂1, x̂2) = (6, 24). Under an optimal scheme guaranteeing
full investment, agent 1 and agent 2 receive expected net returns of 10% and 15% re-
spectively in the former case, whereas in the latter case these expected net returns are
10% and 12.5%. The range is therefore smaller under the more unequal distribution of
capital: (12.5− 10)% < (15− 10)%.
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Of course, the range of agents’ capital amounts is larger when capital is more un-
equally distributed. In the example, this range is 20−10 under (x1, x2) and 24−6 under
(x̂1, x̂2). The net effect of heterogeneity on the range of final capital is thus unclear, as fi-
nal capital holdings depend on both the agents’ investments and their net returns. In the
example, the range of final capital is larger under (x̂1, x̂2): 24(1 + 12.5%)−6(1 + 10%) >
20(1 + 15%) − 10(1 + 10%). More generally, either direction is possible depending on
parameters. That is, perhaps surprisingly, we find that by reducing the dispersion of
net returns, a more unequal distribution of initial capital can lead to a more equal
distribution of final capital.24
5 Firm’s Initial Capital
Our model has considered a firm which owns no initial capital, so any payments it offers
to the agents must be self-financed by its project. In this section, we study how the firm’s
problem changes when the firm has some capital of its own. We show that our main
qualitative results continue to hold, with larger investors receiving higher net returns
than smaller ones. What is new is that the firm now uses its funds to insure part of
the investment, and we are able to provide a characterization of the level of insurance
offered to different investors depending on their size.
Suppose the firm has initial capital W > 0 and wishes to raise an additional amount
XN from the set S of N agents. Consider a scheme specifying investments (xn)n∈S and
returns (rn, kn)n∈S, where without loss we take xn > 0 for each n ∈ S. The firm’s budget




rnynxn ≤ W + A and
N∑
n=1
knynxn ≤ W. (BCW )
If W ≥ θXN , the problem is trivial: the firm can offer net returns (rn, kn) = (θ, θ)
to each agent n ∈ S and fund its project at the safe rate. As all the agents are given
full insurance, there is no coordination problem among them. In what follows, we thus
assume that the firm’s capital is limited, satisfying W < θXN .
The firm’s problem is the same as that in (P) but with the budget constraint given
by (BCW ) above (and with the total investment in the project now including the firm’s
capital W in addition to the capital XN raised from the agents). To solve this problem,
24For an example, take F (x) = x5 for x ∈ [0, 1], θ = 10%, and capital amounts (x1, x2) = ( 13 , 23 ) and




4 ). The range of final capital is 0.81 under (x1, x2) and 0.79 under (x̂1, x̂2).
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observe first that Lemma 1 continues to hold in this setting. The firm’s scheme must thus
specify a permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) such that, for each i ∈ S, agent ni is willing to
invest when agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest, no matter the rest. The key difference relative
to the analysis of Section 3.1 is that the firm can now pay positive returns under failure,
and hence, in principle, offer returns satisfying ki > ri to some agent ni ∈ S. Such an
agent’s expected payoff from investing with the firm would be decreasing in the other
agents’ investments. That is, unlike when W = 0, inducing strategic substitutabiliy is
now feasible.
Nevertheless, we are able to show that an optimal scheme for the firm induces strategic
complementarities among all the agents. Suppose by contradiction that ki > ri for some
agent ni ∈ S in any optimal scheme. Such an agent’s participation requires ki > θ, and
so by (BCW ) and W < θXN , there must exist j 6= i with kj < θ < rj. Furthermore,
by analogous logic as in Section 3.1, agent ni must be indifferent over investing with the
firm when all other agents invest, whereas agent nj must be indifferent conditioning on
only agents (n1, . . . , nj−1) investing. Since agent ni then conditions on a weakly higher
probability of success than agent nj, we consider a perturbation that reduces ki and
increases ri while at the same time increasing kj and reducing rj. We show that this
perturbation either contradicts the optimality of the original scheme or allows us to
construct another optimal scheme which satisfies ri ≥ ki for all i ∈ S.
Using the strategic complementaries, we obtain the following characterization:
Proposition 5. Consider the firm’s problem with initial capital W > 0. Suppose 1/F (x)
is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and there exists an optimal scheme guaranteeing in-
vestments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X. Then an optimal such scheme specifies a permutation
pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) satisfying
xn∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ xn∗N













xn∗j , WN ≡ W , and Wi ≡ max{W−
N∑
j=i+1
k∗jxn∗j , 0} for i ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}.
An optimal scheme for the firm includes full-insurance contracts, with returns under
success and failure equal to the safe rate θ. That is, we find that the firm uses its initial
capital W to fully insure some of the capital XN that it raises from the agents. Since
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W is limited, only an amount of capital W/θ can be insured. Once W is depleted,
the firm faces the same problem that we solved in the previous sections, and hence it
guarantees investment using a scheme analogous to that characterized in Proposition 1
and Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 shows that the smallest investors are the ones who receive insurance.
The intuition is simple. The firm’s cost of fully insuring the portion of capital W/θ is
equal to W and thus independent of how this capital is distributed among the agents.
In contrast, the firm’s cost of raising the additional capital XN −W/θ does depend on
its distribution: by Proposition 3, this cost is minimized when XN −W/θ is raised from
the largest investors. Consequently, it follows that it is optimal for the firm to raise the
fully insured portion W/θ from the smallest investors.
The characterization in Proposition 5 shows that our results in Section 3 and Section 4
are robust to the firm owning initial capital.25 In addition, this characterization offers
predictions on the levels of risk afforded to investors of different size. Interestingly,
empirical studies find that large investors hold riskier portfolios than small investors, and
some of the explanations discussed in the literature include capital market imperfections
and investors’ risk aversion declining with wealth (see Carroll, 2000).26 We contribute
to this discussion from a different perspective, that of optimal design. Proposition 5
indeed predicts a high-risk, high-return investment for large investors and a low-risk,
low-return investment for small investors. Here, however, the distinction arises as an
optimal solution to the firm’s problem of raising capital in the presence of strategic risk.
6 Discussion
Below we discuss some applications and extensions of our model and results.
Applications. We have formulated our problem in the context of a firm that raises
capital to fund a project. There are various examples that may fit this description.
As mentioned, our results resonate with evidence from private equity investments. The
project in our model could also concern the building of a property to which agents
contribute with purchase commitments, or fund-raising for a charity as in Andreoni
(1998). We next discuss some further applications that relate to other literatures.
25Note that the smallest investors who receive full insurance also receive a lower net return on their
investment compared to other investors, since θ ≤ F (W +XN )r∗i + (1− F (W +XN ))k∗i for any i ∈ S.
26Capital market imperfections may cause entrepreneurs to finance their activities with their own
capital and to earn a high return on their investments.
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Exclusive contracts: A number of influential papers study how an incumbent firm may
coordinate buyers on signing exclusive dealing contracts (see Rasmusen, Ramseyer and
Wiley, 1991; Innes and Sexton, 1994; Segal and Whinston, 2000). Our analysis can be
applied to this question. Consider an incumbent monopolist offering exclusive dealing
contracts to buyers of different size, namely who differ in the number of units that
they demand.27 A potential entrant enters the market only if the total demand that has
contracted with the monopolist is below a stochastic threshold, and the monopolist offers
prices contingent on entry to guarantee a given total demand. Our results suggest that
under certain conditions on the threshold distribution, the monopolist will offer lower
unit prices to larger buyers compared to smaller ones. Moreover, the more heterogeneous
the buyer population, the higher the monopolist’s incentive to offer exclusive dealing
contracts to fight market entry.
Joint task: Consider a team incentive problem similar to that in Winter (2004) but
allowing for heterogeneity. A principal contracts with multiple agents who can contribute
towards a joint task. Agents differ in their ability, with more skilled agents being able
to make larger contributions than less skilled ones. Suppose that the probability of
completing the joint task is increasing in the sum of agents’ contributions, and the
principal offers rewards contingent on task completion in order to guarantee a level of
participation. Applying our results to this setting suggests that optimal rewards will
be convex: the principal compensates agents with high ability more than proportionally
relative to those with lower ability.
Bank runs: A sizable literature studies bank runs and how to prevent them. Consider a
simple setting in which N agents have their funds deposited in a bank and can withdraw
them at any time. Suppose there is a random threshold such that if the total withdrawal
exceeds it, a bank run occurs and the bank collapses. To exclude a run, the bank can
offer depositors collateral (to be paid in the case of a run) or a higher interest rate on
deposits (absent a run). A conjecture that can be derived from our analysis is that large
depositors will be treated more favorably than small ones even on a per-dollar basis,
whether it is collateral or an increased interest rate that is used to prevent the run.
Social planner and policy implications. We have solved the problem of a firm that
seeks to maximize its profits while guaranteeing a unique outcome. We point out here
that our results also have implications for a planner who internalizes agents’ welfare.
27Note that due to compatibility and cost considerations, these demands are often indivisible.
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Consider the problem of a planner who maximizes the probability of project success,
subject to budget and unique implementation constraints as those in program (P). Be-
cause the budget constraint requires limiting the cost of raising capital, the solution to
this problem coincides with that of the firm when the budget constraint is tight enough,
namely when the surplus A from project success is sufficiently small. Specifically, the
planner may have to give higher net returns to larger investors compared to smaller
investors in order to be able to self-finance the investment in the project. Furthermore,
the planner may benefit from a more unequal distribution of capital among the agents,
as such a distribution allows to reduce costs and make the investment viable.
Of course, things change if we take different social welfare functions, and in particular
if we consider a concern for inequality. Our analysis shows that the need to address
strategic risk gives rise to an important tradeoff between equality and efficiency.
Policy responses aimed at limiting inequality should support small investors, who
we find will be either excluded from investing or given worse terms than others. Inter-
mediaries that bundle the capital of many small private investors into a single larger
investment may help in this regard, provided that they do not extract the entire ad-
ditional surplus by charging high fees. Regulators can also generate instruments to
facilitate coordination. For example, it may be possible to promote platforms where
small investors can make commitments to invest that are legally binding but contingent
on a minimum total investment. Such instruments would reduce the strategic risk which,
we have shown, drives inequality.
Threshold distribution. Our analysis has focused on situations in which the distri-
bution F of the investment threshold satisfies the condition of 1/F (x) being convex. As
noted in Section 3.2, 1/F (x) cannot be globally concave, and it is indeed globally convex
for most commonly used distribution functions. Yet, it is worth considering how our
results would change if the condition on F is not met.
Given capital amounts (xn)n∈S, suppose 1/F (x) is concave over the whole relevant
range, namely for x ∈ [min{xn|n ∈ S}, XN ]. Then our results in Proposition 2 would be
reversed: given optimal returns (r∗i , k
∗
i )i∈S as characterized in Proposition 1, we would
find that an optimal permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) ranks the agents in increasing as
opposed to decreasing size order. The intuition is the same as in Proposition 2 but also
reversed: the firm benefits from placing large investors in the permutation according to
when the risk premium drops most sharply with investment, and if 1/F (x) is concave, this
occurs at the end of the permutation, when Xi =
∑i
j=1 xnj is largest. The implication
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is that larger investors would now receive lower net returns than smaller investors, as
opposed to the case in which 1/F (x) is convex. The contrasting results that we obtain
in the two cases offer predictions that could be empirically tested.
Regarding the analysis in Section 4, we maintained the assumption of 1/F (x) convex
throughout that section for consistency with our results in Section 3. However, our
results on the distribution of capital in Section 4 are more general. In fact, if 1/F (x) is
concave over the whole relevant range, one can follow the same proof strategy used for
Proposition 3 to verify that the result sill applies, namely that the firm benefits from
distributions of capital which are more unequal.
Proportional surplus. Our model has assumed that project success yields a fixed
surplus A > 0, and only the probability of success varies with the amount of capital
invested in the project. More generally, the surplus from project success may also be
a function of the investment. Consider a simple case in which success yields a surplus
Rx if capital x is invested in the project, for some R > θ. Given a scheme specifying
investments (xn)n∈S and returns (rn, kn)n∈S, the firm’s budget constraint then requires









knynxn ≤ 0. (BCR)
Relative to the original budget constraint (BC), this constraint places further restric-
tions on the firm’s scheme. In fact, note that given R, (BCR) implies (BC) under a fixed
surplus AR ≡ RXN , as both constraints require that the sum of payments under success
do not exceed this amount. But (BCR) adds restrictions, by requiring that the payment
to any agent under success be no larger than the surplus generated by the project when
only such an agent has invested. That is, the firm’s budget constraint now requires
maxn∈S rn ≤ R.
Despite this difference, we can show that the analysis of Section 3 continues to apply
to this setting. Specifically, given R, consider the firm’s problem in (P) when project
success yields a fixed surplus equal to AR. As just explained, this is a relaxed problem
relative to the firm’s proportional surplus problem that is subject to (BCR). Hence, it
follows that if the solution to (P) described in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 satisfies
(BCR)—namely, if this solution specifies r
∗
n∗1
≤ R—then it is also a solution to the firm’s
proportional surplus problem. Moreover, note that among all schemes guaranteeing
investments (xn)n∈S subject to (BC), the solution to (P) minimizes the highest return
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that the firm has to pay to any agent n ∈ S under success. Therefore, if the solution
described in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 specifies r∗n∗1 > R, no scheme can guarantee
investments (xn)n∈S while satisfying (BCR).
A Proofs
Throughout the Appendix, we abbreviate Nash equilibrium by NE.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
As defined in Section 3.1, denote the aggregate capital of the first i agents in a permu-
tation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) by Xi ≡
∑i
j=1 xnj .
(=⇒) We begin by proving that (C1)-(C2) imply a permutation as described in the
lemma. Suppose that (C1)-(C2) hold under a given scheme. Note that by (C2), there
must exist an agent n1 who is willing to invest with the firm when no other agent does.
If this was not true, there would be a NE in which no agent invests and no agent is
indifferent between investing and not, contradicting (C2). Hence, we have:
r1F (X1) + k1 (1− F (X1)) ≥ θ. (7)
Additionally, by (C1), agent n1 must be willing to invest with the firm when all other
agents do. Otherwise, there would not be a NE in which all agents invest with the firm,
contradicting (C1). Hence, we also have:
r1F (XN) + k1 (1− F (XN)) ≥ θ. (8)
For any set of agents SI ⊆ S ∪ ∅, let X(SI) ≡
∑
i∈SI xni be the aggregate capital of
the agents in SI . Since F (X1) ≤ F (X1 +X(SI)) ≤ F (XN) for SI ⊆ {2, . . . , N} ∪ ∅,
equations (7) and (8) imply
r1F (X1 +X(SI)) + k1 (1− F (X1 +X(SI))) ≥ θ
for all SI ⊆ {2, . . . , N} ∪ ∅. Therefore, agent n1 is willing to invest with the firm no
matter what the other agents do.
We now proceed by induction: for any i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, suppose that there is an
agent ni who is willing to invest with the firm if agents (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest, regardless
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of what the other agents do. Then there must be an agent ni+1 who is willing to invest
with the firm if agents (n1, . . . , ni) invest and the other agents do not. Otherwise, there
would be a NE in which agents (n1, . . . , ni) invest with the firm, agents (ni+1, . . . , nN) do
not, and no non-investing agent is indifferent between investing and not, contradicting
(C2). Thus, we have
ri+1F (Xi+1) + ki+1 (1− F (Xi+1)) ≥ θ. (9)
Moreover, by (C1), agent ni+1 must also be willing to invest with the firm when all other
agents do:
ri+1F (XN) + ki+1 (1− F (XN)) ≥ θ. (10)
Since F (Xi+1) ≤ F (Xi+1 +X(SI)) ≤ F (XN) for SI ⊆ {i+ 2, . . . , N}∪ ∅, equations (9)
and (10) imply
ri+1F (Xi+1 +X(SI)) + ki+1 (1− F (Xi+1 +X(SI))) ≥ θ
for all SI ⊆ {i+ 2, . . . , N} ∪ ∅. Therefore, agent ni+1 is willing to invest with the firm if
agents (n1, . . . , ni) invest with the firm, regardless of what the other agents do.
(⇐=) We next prove that a permutation as described in the lemma implies (C1)-(C2).
First, note that since each agent ni ∈ S is willing to invest if (n1, . . . , ni−1) invest no
matter what the rest does, it must be that each agent ni is willing to invest when all
other agents invest. Hence, there exists a NE in which all agents invest, yielding (C1).
Next, suppose by contradiction that (C2) does not hold, namely there exists a NE
in which some agents do not invest with the firm and all such agents strictly prefer not
to invest. Call the set of non-investing agents SNI . We claim that if all agents ni ∈ SNI
strictly prefer not to invest, then SNI must be empty. Clearly, n1 cannot be in SNI ,
as n1 is willing to invest with the firm no matter what the other agents do. So n1
must be in the set of agents who invest, call it SI . Now proceed by induction: for any
i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, suppose that agents (n1, . . . , ni) are in SI . Then by the permutation
stated in the lemma, agent ni+1 is willing to invest with the firm, and thus she cannot
be in SNI either. It follows that no agent is in SNI . Therefore, in any NE in which SNI
is nonempty, at least one agent in SNI is willing to invest, yielding (C2).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by proving the first part of the proposition. By Lemma 1, any optimal scheme
specifies some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and returns (ri, ki)i∈S which satisfy, for
each i ∈ S and each j ∈ {i, . . . , N},
riF (Xj) + ki (1− F (Xj)) ≥ θ. (11)
As argued in the text, the firm’s budget constraint (BC) requires ki ≤ 0 for each i ∈ S.
Given this and θ > 0, equation (11) then requires ri > 0 for each i ∈ S. It follows
that ri > 0 ≥ ki for each i ∈ S, and thus the left-hand side of (11) is increasing in
F (Xj). Since F (Xj) is increasing in j, it follows that (11) holds for each i ∈ S and each
j ∈ {i, . . . , N} if and only if, for each i ∈ S,
riF (Xi) + ki (1− F (Xi)) ≥ θ. (12)
We show that optimality requires (12) to hold with equality for each i ∈ S. Suppose
by contradiction that there is an optimal scheme under which (12) holds as a strict
inequality for some i′ ∈ S. Then consider a perturbation in which we reduce ri′ by
ε > 0 arbitrarily small while keeping all other returns unchanged. Since (12) was a strict
inequality for i′, this constraint continues to be satisfied for all i ∈ S. It is also clear
that the budget constraint (BC) is relaxed by the perturbation. Moreover, note that the











kixni (1− F (XN)) , (13)
which is decreasing in ri for any i ∈ S. Therefore, we obtain that the perturbation
increases the firm’s expected payoff while preserving incentives and the firm’s budget
constraint, and thus the original scheme cannot be optimal.
We next prove the second part of the proposition. By the claims above, any optimal
scheme specifies some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and returns (ri, ki)i∈S satisfying
riF (Xi) + ki (1− F (Xi)) = θ (14)
for each i ∈ S. We show that it is optimal to set ki = 0 for each i ∈ S, which combined
with (14) implies ri = θ/F (Xi) for each i ∈ S. Suppose by contradiction that this is not
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the case, i.e. any optimal scheme has ki′ < 0 for some i
′ ∈ S. (Recall that by the firm’s
budget constraint, ki ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S.) Then consider the following perturbation: for





Since we had ki′ < 0, the perturbed scheme continues to satisfy the firm’s budget con-
straint (BC). Moreover, by construction, the left-hand side of (14) is unchanged by the
perturbation, so the agents’ incentives are preserved. Finally, note that the perturbation
changes the firm’s expected payoff V in (13) by
ε
(F (XN)− F (Xi′))
F (Xi′)
,
which is positive (and strictly positive if i′ ∈ {1, . . . , N−1}). Therefore, the perturbation
increases the firm’s expected payoff while preserving incentives and the budget constraint.
Since we can perform this perturbation whenever ki < 0 for some i ∈ S, this contradicts
the assumption that an optimal scheme with ki = 0 for each i ∈ S does not exist.
Finally, we prove that if an optimal scheme exists, there exists an optimal scheme




i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0) for
each i ∈ S. As shown above, any optimal scheme specifies some permutation pi =
(n1, . . . , nN) and returns (ri, ki)i∈S such that (14) holds for each i ∈ S. It is clear that
for each agent ni, the return ri that satisfies this binding participation constraint is
decreasing in ki. Thus, given a permutation pi, setting ki as high as possible for each
i ∈ S, subject to (BC), minimizes the firm’s costs under success, ∑Ni=1 rixni . It follows
that setting ki = 0 for each i ∈ S maximally relaxes the firm’s budget constraint. As
we have shown that setting (r∗i , k
∗
i ) = (θ/F (Xi), 0) for some permutation pi is optimal
subject to the budget constraint, this proves the claim.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that 1/F (x) is convex for all x ∈ [0, XN ]. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. Define


















We show that for any a ≥ 0 and b > c > 0 satisfying a+ b+ c ≤ XN ,
Ψ (a, b, c) ≤ 0. (16)
To prove this claim, observe that











F ′ (a+ z)
(F (a+ z))2
dz.
Define ψ (z˜) = cz˜+b
2−c2
b
. Note that ψ is linear with ψ (c) = b, ψ (b+ c) = b + c, and
ψ′(z˜) = c
b
. Hence, a change of variables yields:













Note that given b > c, ψ (z˜) ≥ z˜ for all z˜ in the integration region. Given a ≥ 0 and
a + b + c ≤ XN , the assumption that 1/F (x) is convex for all x ∈ [0, XN ] then implies
that the integrand in (17) is (weakly) negative. The claim follows.
Step 2. By Step 1, (16) holds for any a ≥ 0 and b > c > 0 satisfying a+ b+ c ≤ XN .










F (a+ b+ c)
. (18)
We now show that there is an optimal permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) satisfying
xn∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ xn∗N . (19)
Suppose that some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) is optimal. If pi satisfies (19), we are
done. Suppose instead that (19) is not satisfied. Take the lowest index j < N for which
xnj < xnj+1 . We perform a perturbation in which we swap agents nj and nj+1. Note
that this swap has no effect on Xi for any i < j or i > j + 1. Hence, the perturbation
only affects the jth and (j + 1)th terms of the sum in the firm’s costs in (5). Under the








Xj−1 + xnj + xnj+1
) . (20)
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Xj−1 + xnj + xnj+1
) (21)
Letting a = Xj−1, b = xnj+1 , and c = xnj , it follows from (18) that the sum in (21) is no
larger than the sum in (20). Therefore, the perturbation (weakly) reduces the firm’s costs
and thus increases the firm’s expected payoff. Note that we can proceed by performing
this perturbation for the next pair of agents with (higher) indices (i, i + 1) such that
xni < xni+1 , repeating until the permutation satisfies (19). Since each perturbation
increases the firm’s expected payoff and the original permutation was optimal, we obtain
that a permutation satisfying (19) is optimal.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The distribution Ĥ can be obtained from the original distribution H by performing a
finite sequence of capital transfers from small to large investors (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1970). Thus, it suffices to show that each such transfer makes the firm better off.
Without loss of generality, we can consider the first such transfer. Let the permutation
pi = (n1, . . . , nN) be optimal under (xn)n∈S. Take any two agents nj and n` where j < `
and, thus, xnj ≥ xn` . For any ∆ ∈ (0, xn` ], let (x̂n)n∈S be the result of transferring
∆ units of capital from agent n` to agent nj. We will show that the firm’s minimized
costs under (x̂n)n∈S are lower than its minimized costs under (xn)n∈S when keeping the
permutation pi unchanged. Since the transfer does not change the probability of project
success (as it does not affect the aggregate capital of the agents), it will follow that the
firm’s expected payoff under (x̂n)n∈S is higher than that under (xn)n∈S when keeping
the permutation pi unchanged. Clearly, changing to a permutation that is optimal under
(x̂n)n∈S can only increase the firm’s payoff from these investments further, so this is
sufficient to prove the claim.
To show that the transfer from agent n` to agent nj reduces the firm’s costs when
keeping the permutation unchanged, note first that the costs from returns paid to agents
ni with rank i < j and i > ` are unaffected. The change in the firm’s minimized costs
in (5), divided by the constant θ > 0, is thus equal to
∆



























F (Xi + ∆)
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Define ψ (z˜) =
xni+1 z˜−Xi(xni+1−∆)
∆
. Note that ψ is linear with ψ (Xi) = Xi, ψ (Xi + ∆) =


















Note that since ∆ ≤ xn` and xn` ≤ xni+1 for all j ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, we have ∆ ≤ xni+1 for
all j ≤ i ≤ `− 1. Thus, one can verify that ψ (z˜) ≥ z˜ for all z˜ in the integration region
and j ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. Given Xi ≥ 0 and Xi + xni+1 ≤ XN for all j ≤ i ≤ ` − 1, the
assumption that 1/F (x) is convex for all x ∈ [0, XN ] then implies that the integrand in
(23) is (weakly) negative. It follows that Λi ≤ 0 for all j ≤ i ≤ `− 1 and thus (22) is no
larger than a (weakly) negative number. The claim follows.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The distribution Ĥ can be obtained from the original distribution H by performing a
finite sequence of capital transfers from small to large investors (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1970). Thus, it suffices to show that each such transfer weakly reduces the range of net
returns. Denote the original investments by (xn)n∈S and the resulting investments follow-
ing a transfer by (x̂n)n∈S. Let pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and pi = (n̂1, . . . , n̂N) be permutations
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that rank the agents in decreasing size order under (xn)n∈S and (x̂n)n∈S respectively,
where we consider only agents with strictly positive amounts of capital. The smallest




= θ regardless of how XN is distributed among the agents. The largest
investor’s expected net return is equal to F (XN)
θ
F (xn1 )
under (xn)n∈S and F (XN) θF (x̂n̂1 )
under (x̂n)n∈S. Note that since (x̂n)n∈S is the result of a transfer from a smaller to a
larger investor, x̂n̂1 ≥ xn1 . Thus, given F increasing, it follows that the transfer either
reduces or keeps unchanged the net return of the largest investor. The claim follows.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We consider the firm’s problem with initial capital W > 0. As stated, suppose 1/F (x)
is convex for x ∈ [0, X], X > 0, and there exists an optimal scheme guaranteeing
investments (xn)n∈S with XN ≤ X. We show that an optimal such scheme specifies a
permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗




i )i∈S as described in the proposition.
Optimal returns. We begin by showing that an optimal scheme specifies returns
(r∗i , k
∗
i )i∈S for some permutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN). Observe that the result in Lemma 1
applies to this setting without change. Hence, any optimal scheme specifies some per-
mutation pi = (n1, . . . , nN) and returns (ri, ki)i∈S which satisfy, for each i ∈ S and each
j ∈ {i, . . . , N},
riF (W +Xj) + ki (1− F (W +Xj)) ≥ θ. (24)
Suppose first that ri ≥ ki for some i ∈ S. By the arguments in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1, we must then have ri ≥ θ and (24) holding with equality for j = i:
riF (W +Xi) + ki (1− F (W +Xi)) = θ. (25)
Suppose next that ri < ki for some i ∈ S. Then analogous arguments now yield ki > θ
and (24) holding with equality for j = N :
riF (W +XN) + ki (1− F (W +XN)) = θ. (26)
Let us define
ηi ≡





ηi if ri ≥ kiηN if ri < ki.
Note that by (25) and (26), if ri 6= ki, changing ki by ε > 0 arbitrarily small and ri by
−εη˜i preserves agent i’s incentives.
The following four claims yield that the returns (r∗i , k
∗
i )i∈S described in the proposition
are optimal.
Claim 1: There is an optimal scheme satisfying r∗i ≥ k∗i for all i ∈ S.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that ki > ri for some i ∈ S in any optimal scheme. Take
any such scheme and i ∈ S. By (24), ki > θ, and by (BCW ) and (24), kj < θ < rj for
some j 6= i. Consider a perturbation in which we increase kj by ε > 0 arbitrarily small
and reduce rj by εη˜j, while at the same time reducing ki by ε
xnj
xni




. Note that η˜i = ηN and η˜j = ηj ≥ ηN . The perturbed scheme therefore continues
to satisfy the firm’s budget constraint (BCW ) and, by (25) and (26), it preserves the






If we can pick j < N , the perturbation strictly increases the firm’s expected payoff,
contradicting the optimality of the original scheme. So suppose that in the original
scheme, k` ≥ θ for all ` 6= N . Then we can perform the perturbation for j = N
without affecting the firm’s expected payoff. Moreover, we can continue performing
this perturbation until we obtain k` = θ = r` for all ` 6= N . Since the perturbation
keeps
∑
`∈S k`xn` unchanged and we end up with
∑
`6=N k`xn` = θ
∑
`6=N xn` , the fact
that we must have started with
∑
`∈S k`xn` ≤ W < θXN implies that we end up with
kNxnN < θxnN . Thus, we obtain kN < θ < rN , and this completes the construction of
an optimal scheme with r` ≥ k` for all ` ∈ S.
Claim 2: There is an optimal scheme satisfying k∗i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S.
Proof: By Claim 1 and (25), there is an optimal scheme satisfying
r∗iF (W +Xi) + k
∗
i (1− F (W +Xi)) = θ (27)
for all i ∈ S. Claim 2 then follows from analogous arguments to those used in the proof
of Proposition 1.
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i xni = W .
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that
∑
i∈S kixni < W in any optimal scheme. Take any
such scheme. Note that there must exist j ∈ S with kj < θ. Then consider a pertur-
bation in which we increase kj by ε > 0 arbitrarily small and reduce rj by εηj. Since∑
i∈S kixni < W , the perturbed scheme continues to satisfy the firm’s budget constraint
(BCW ), and by (27) it preserves the agents’ incentives. Moreover, the perturbation
changes the firm’s expected payoff V by
xnjε
(F (W +XN)− F (W +Xj))
F (W +Xj)
,
which is positive (and strictly positive if j ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}). Since we can perform this
perturbation until
∑
i∈S kixni = W , we obtain a contradiction, proving the claim.
Claim 4: In any optimal scheme, k∗i ∈ (0, θ) for at most one agent ni ∈ S.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that there exists an optimal scheme specifying ki, kj ∈
(0, θ) for some i, j ∈ S, i 6= j. Without loss, take i > j. Then we can perform a
perturbation like the one considered in Claim 1: we increase kj by ε > 0 arbitrarily small,
reduce rj by εη˜j, reduce ki by ε
xnj
xni
, and increase ri by εη˜i
xnj
xni
. Since η˜j = ηj > ηi = η˜i,
the perturbation satisfies the firm’s budget constraint, preserves the agents’ incentives,
and strictly increases the firm’s expected payoff V .
Optimal permutation. Given the characterization of the optimal returns, we next
show that the permutation pi∗ = (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
N) described in the proposition is optimal.




i )i∈S. Note that for some










i ) = (θ, θ) for all
i > iW . It then follows from Proposition 2 that an optimal ranking of agents ni for
i < iW satisfies
xn1 ≥ . . . ≥ xniW−1 .
Furthermore, by Proposition 3 and 1/F (x) convex, any mean-preserving spread of the
distribution of (xni)i<iW lowers the firm’s cost. Instead, for agents ni for i > iW , neither
the ranking of these agents nor the distribution of their capital affects the firm’s cost.




Consequently, it follows that it is optimal for the firm to specify a permutation satisfying
xn1 ≥ . . . ≥ xniW−1 ≥ xniW+1 ≥ . . . ≥ xnN .
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To complete the proof, we next show that an optimal permutation also satisfies




W . Suppose that neither of these holds. The firm’s cost of raising xniW is equal to
F (W +XN)xniW r
∗
iW
+ (1− F (W +XN))xniW k∗iW .
Substituting with the optimal returns, taking into account that min{θxniW ,WiW } =
WiW , yields
F (W +XN)
F (W +XiW )
[
xniW θ −WiW (1− F (W +XiW )))
]














This expression shows that the firm’s cost of raising xniW is equal to the cost of paying net





on the remaining portion xniW −WiW /θ. By Proposition 3 and 1/F (x)
convex, it follows that a permutation satisfying xniW−1 ≥ xniW ≥ xniW+1 is optimal.
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